Se eu pudesse
pelas frias manhãs
acordar tiritando
fustigado pela ventania
que me abre a cortina do céu
e ver, do cimo dos meus montes,
o quadro roxo
de um perturbado nascer do sol
a leste de Timor
Se eu pudesse
pelos tórridos sóis
cavalgar embevecido
de encontro a mim mesmo
nas serenas planícies do capim
e sentir o cheiro de animais
bebendo das nascentes
que murmurariam no ar
lendas de Timor
Se eu pudesse
pelas tardes de calma
sentir o cansaço
da natureza sensual
espreguiçando-se no seu suor
e ouvir contar as canseiras
sob os risos
das crianças nuas e descalças
de todo o Timor
Se eu pudesse
ao entardecer das ondas
caminhar pela areia
entregue a mim mesmo
no enlevo molhado da brisa
e tocar a imensidão do mar
num sopro da alma
que permita meditar o futuro
da ilha de Timor
Se eu pudesse
ao cantar dos grilos
falar para a lua
pelas janelas da noite
e contar-lhe romances do povo
a união inviolável dos corpos
para criar filhos
e ensinar-lhes a crescer e a amar
a Pátria Timor!
Olho o céu e agradeço
Ter atendido minhas preces
Pacificar meu país
Trazer nova esperança
Restituir o que mereces
Plantar nova raiz
Que dará frutos de mudança
Que venha a paz e a concórdia
Que floresça o entendimento
Que o diálogo seja permanente
Que a mentira não tenha casa
Nem lugar para se esconder
Que o país seja nosso
Acolhedor e independente
Que a liberdade voe na asa
Da alegria que meu povo sente
12 comments:
Ele pode, com a ajuda dos Americanos e Australianos.
Sera que o Maracuja tambem foi alvejado, ou estara a tomar conta da Kristy?
Do Diario de Noticias
TIMOR: CONFLITOS INTERNOS E INTERESSES ESTRANGEIROS
Barbedo de Magalhães
professor catedrático da Faculdade de Engenharia
do Porto e presidente do IASI
Em 18 de Janeiro de 2008, dia seguinte ao do lançamento do seu livro sobre Timor na Fundação Mário Soares, o autor teve uma longa conversa com o embaixador da Austrália em Lisboa. Preocupado com a situação em Timor, disse ao embaixador que considerava imprescindível que o novo primeiro-ministro, Kevin Rudd, um velho amigo de Timor e um amigo pessoal de Ramos-Horta, controlasse as forças australianas colocadas em Timor, e os seus serviços secretos. De facto, em governos anteriores, estas tinham estado mais ao serviço da Austrália e de interesses económicos de algumas petrolíferas do que da estabilidade e da democracia no novo país.
A ineficácia dos serviços de informações das forças internacionais, quase exclusivamente australianas, que não souberam prever e evitar os ataques contra as duas principais figuras do Estado timorense, nem capturar ou neutralizar os militares que apoiavam o major Reinado, é um sinal de que, até ao dia do atentado, a política herdada do Governo anterior ainda não tinha sido mudada no terreno.
Convém não esquecer que em Março de 2002 o Governo de Howard retirou a Austrália dos tribunais internacionais relacionados com fronteiras marítimas. Em Dezembro desse ano, uma semana depois do MNE Downer ter ameaçado o PM timorense de lhe dar uma lição de política, a casa de Alkatiri foi revistada por um australiano e incendiada. A fúria de Downer contra Mari resultava de este não ceder às excessivas e ilegais exigências australianas relativamente ao petróleo do mar de Timor.
Aos exacerbados interesses económicos estrangeiros soma-se uma diferença de estratégias e um conflito quase permanente entre Mari e Xanana.
Ela vem dos anos oitenta, quando Xanana substituiu a política radical e exclusivista da Fretilin, por uma política mais realista e abrangente, de inclusão de todos os timorenses, mesmo que colaborassem com o ocupante. Nesse quadro assumiu o compromisso de que Timor-Leste não se tornaria numa "ameaça à estabilidade da área" e de que se oporia à eventual tomada de poder por qualquer partido hegemonista e pouco democrático.
A Constituição foi feita para marginalizar Xanana do processo político. Esta marginalização, os conflitos com a Igreja e o clima de medo criado pelo ex-ministro Lobato contribuíram fortemente para a eclosão da crise de 2006. A reacção de Xanana, tipicamente de guerrilheiro, também não foi a mais feliz.
Ao afirmar que o actual governo, de maioria parlamentar, era ilegítimo, Alkatiri continuou a tentar destruir politicamente um líder essencial para Timor. Com isso enfraqueceu a democracia, debilitou o estado e contribuiu para que este ficasse ainda mais dependente de forças e interesses estrangeiros.
(1) Barbedo de Magalhães, António Pinto - Timor-Leste - Interesses internacionais e actores locais. Afrontamento. Porto, 2007
Para que se não repita este laxismo intencional ou incompetente de "tropas de ocupação" australianas e neozelandesas!
http://www.petitiononline.com/mil1001/petition.html
Desconfio muito que o Maracuja era o Reinado! Nao acham?
By Patrick O’Connor
1 March 2008
East Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao has seized upon the crisis sparked by the February 11 wounding of President Jose Ramos-Horta and killing of former major Alfredo Reinado to enforce a number of repressive measures aimed at consolidating his unstable government. A spokesperson for Gusmao’s government announced on Monday that the “state of siege”—which involves a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew and a ban on demonstrations and unauthorised meetings—has been extended to March 23. More than 200 people have already been arrested, mostly for violating the curfew, although opposition parliamentarians and journalists have also been targeted.
The Gusmao government’s rush to utilise authoritarian forms of rule raises yet again the many outstanding questions concerning the events surrounding Reinado’s killing. According to the official version promoted by the government and the Australian and international press, the rebel soldier was shot dead after he and his men attempted to either kill or kidnap both President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao as part of a failed coup attempt. This account represents the least likely explanation for what took place on February 11.
While details remain murky, what is known points to the possibility that Reinado was set up for assassination. The rebel soldier had earlier threatened to publicly release details of Gusmao’s alleged role in directly instigating a mutiny of soldiers (the “petitioners”) in 2006. The mutiny sparked a political crisis that culminated in the intervention of hundreds of Australian troops and the ousting of the former Fretilin government. Reinado’s allegation was issued via a DVD that was widely circulated in January throughout East Timor.
The old adage, cui bono (to whose benefit?), remains a standard rule in criminal investigations. In light of what has transpired over the past fortnight, the undisputed primary beneficiaries of Reinado’s death have been the Australian-led foreign military forces stationed in East Timor and Gusmao himself.
The prime minister’s adoption of dictatorial-style powers has been met with sharp criticism within the country’s parliament. A number of Fretilin parliamentarians opposed the extension of the “state of siege” on the grounds that the constitutional requirement for a “serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional order” no longer existed. During the debate, opposition even emerged from within Gusmao’s CNRT party. “I and my friends are really disappointed with the implementation of the ‘State of Emergency,’” CNRT parliamentarian Cecilio Caminha declared. “In the ‘State of Emergency’ there are no rules that permit the security apparatus to attack civilian houses at night, and to forbid people from holding meetings and demonstrations.”
Fretilin has accused Gusmao of using the crisis to undermine its position. On February 19, the party’s parliamentarian and media spokesman Jose Teixeira was detained in Dili after six car loads of armed Timorese police allegedly took him from his home. Teixeira later claimed that police had no arrest warrant and acted without the knowledge of the senior police investigating officer. He was released the next day after Mari Alkatiri, Fretilin’s general secretary and former Timorese prime minister, lodged a complaint. “This is political persecution—Teixeira is an effective media spokesman and someone in authority wants to shut him up,” he declared. “It is a disgraceful attempt to politicise the police force and use the investigation into the shooting of the president for party-political gain.”
Both Timorese police and Australian soldiers have also targeted journalists.
On February 23, the East Timor Post’s senior layout editor, Agustinho Ta Pasea, was arrested while en route to the Dili printing presses with a computer file of the newspaper’s weekend edition. Post editor Mouzinho De Araujo told the Australian that Ta Pasea was stopped at 2 a.m., beaten by military police and then taken to a police station where he was assaulted again. De Araujo said his staff member was held for 11 hours on the grounds that he had violated the curfew, before being released with cuts and bruises on his face. “Maybe, it is because our newspaper has been tough on [the] authorities,” the editor said. Ta Pasea’s detention delayed the publication of that day’s Post edition. The Secretariat of State Security later issued a formal apology for the police officers’ use of what it described as “unjustified force”.
The incident came a few days after Time reporter Rory Callinan and photographer John Wilson were detained by Australian troops for three hours at gunpoint outside of Dili as they were attempting to reach the village of Dare. The Australian-dominated International Stabilisation Force (ISF) was conducting an operation in the area, supposedly in pursuit of Reinado’s followers allegedly involved in Ramos-Horta’s shooting. Journalists were refused entry through an ISF roadblock and were told they were barred from the “media free area”. Callinan and Wilson then walked for an hour through a jungle trail to try to access Dare by foot.
Callinan later told the Australian that when they neared the village: “Two Australians jumped out of the bushes wearing ‘camo’ paint, pointing their guns, ordering us to get down. We were told to hand over our mobile phones, all our camera equipment and passports and told to sit without talking. The guy said: ‘We’re detaining you for your own safety and I can’t tell you more.’ I said, ‘So we can’t move?’ He said, ‘I’m telling you, I am detaining you. I can physically detain you if I want, but I choose not to at this point.’ We were wondering why they were letting dozens of East Timorese wander about with no apparent concern for their safety.”
The two men were held in the jungle for three hours, until sundown, when they were told they would be allowed into Dare. After they later walked back to Dili they were held again for breaching curfew. “They confiscated our gear again,” Callinan said. “We said, ‘But you’ve already detained us for three hours, which is why we are in breach of the curfew....’ The East Timorese with us were saying this was the sort of thing that happened under Indonesian times.”
The incident underscores the neo-colonial character of the Australian occupation of “independent” East Timor. Utilising the political crisis for its own ends, the Rudd Labor government has bolstered the size of the intervention force and declared that Australian forces will remain “for as long as they are required.” As with the previous deployments in 1999 and 2006, the latest operation is above all driven by Canberra’s determination to maintain its domination over the strategically significant and oil-rich territory, and to shut out rival powers such as China and Portugal. Rudd and Gusmao appear to have reached a mutually beneficial arrangement in which the Timorese leader gives the Australian military a free hand, in return for the Australian government’s continued political backing. Rudd and his ministers have maintained a strict silence in relation to the Gusmao government’s recent authoritarian measures.
The ISF’s actions in Dare also raise the question as to what Australian troops were doing, that they did not want the media to monitor. The status of the Australian military’s supposed pursuit of Reinado’s wanted men remains unclear. More than 1,100 Australian troops, including at least 80 elite SAS personnel, are now on the ground in East Timor or stationed on naval warships offshore. Gusmao has reportedly authorised these forces to use lethal force. Yet despite the Australian military’s vast array of surveillance technology and extensive knowledge of Reinado’s group, amassed over the last two years, the occupying troops have apparently been unable to track down any of the alleged would-be assassins of Ramos-Horta.
Was Gusmao’s government facing dissolution?
Events since February 11 make clear just how convenient Reinado’s death was for both Gusmao and Canberra.
The former major’s accusation that the prime minister had deliberately instigated the petitioner’s protests in 2006 was seriously undermining Gusmao’s already unstable three-party coalition government. Just as Reinado’s accusations were circulating throughout East Timor, the government passed its first budget, slashing food rations for the 100,000 internally displaced refugees and cutting pensions. At the same time, the government boasted that it was lowering corporate and investment taxes to among the lowest levels in the world.
These measures, which will further increase social inequality in the deeply impoverished country, drew widespread opposition from ordinary Timorese and inflamed tensions and infighting within the government. Rumours spread in Dili that Fernando “La Sama” de Araujo, leader of the Democratic Party and now acting president, would withdraw from the coalition.
Gusmao meanwhile was refusing to deny Reinado’s allegations and threatened to arrest those journalists pursuing the story. Alkatiri demanded that Gusmao resign and that fresh elections be called.
There is evidence indicating that President Ramos-Horta was preparing to publicly endorse such demands. According to the Timor News Line web site, which translates Timorese media reports into English, on February 11 (the same day Reinado was killed) the Diario Nacional reported that: “Fretilin Secretary General, Mari Alkatiri, said President Jose Ramos Horta and the UN Secretary General have agreed with Fretilin’s proposal of holding another election in the country”.
The latest issue of the Indonesian Tempo magazine features an interview with Alkatiri in which the former prime minister claims there was a connection between the events of February 11 and a meeting allegedly convened by President Ramos-Horta a week earlier.
“There was a meeting of politicians at Horta’s residence a week before the shootings,” Alkatiri said. “Attending the meeting were members of the Timorese Reconstruction National Party (CNRT) led by Xanana Gusmao, the Social Democrat Party, the Timor Social Democrat Party Association (ASDT) and the Fretilin Party ... President Horta welcomed the proposal of the Fretilin Party to the UN Secretary-General. Essentially it united all parties under the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) with the Fretilin, and forming an inclusive government, a national unity government. Fretilin itself refused to join in the national unity government like this one. The initiative was taken to resolve the problem of Alfredo Reinado, deserters led by Salsinha Gastao and also the refugees.”
Asked if any of Timor’s “party elites” were involved in Reinado’s killing, Alkatiri refused to directly answer or mention Gusmao by name, but said, “I will just say that the person behind Horta’s shooting perhaps disagreed with the President’s initiative to form a new government and hold another election.”
If Alkatiri’s account is true, it places in fresh perspective the secret deal struck between Ramos-Horta and Reinado just four weeks before the rebel soldier was killed. On January 13, the two men brokered a deal whereby Reinado would first submit to house arrest and then soon after be amnestied by Ramos-Horta. Could it be that the president, formerly a close ally of Gusmao, regarded the break-down in relations between Reinado and the prime minister as an intolerable threat to the agreement he had just brokered, which required the formation of a new coalition administration between Fretilin, the ASDT, and elements of the CNRT?
If so, the official version of Reinado’s killing becomes even more implausible. The former major would have been attempting to assassinate or kidnap Ramos-Horta, who had not only guaranteed his freedom, but was also preparing to lend his weight to the ousting of Gusmao, whom Reinado was accusing of being a criminal and a traitor. On the other hand, if the scenario suggested by Alkatiri’s statements is true, Gusmao would have had an even more powerful motive to eliminate Reinado, and trigger a political crisis through which he could extend his authority.
The possibility of such a conspiracy raises immediate questions regarding the Australian government’s role. There is little possibility that Australian authorities—which include highly placed government and military advisors as well as an extensive network of intelligence agents and informants—would have been ignorant of the various political ructions in Dili. The prospect of a return to a Fretilin-led government would have sounded alarm bells. The former Howard government, with the unstinting support of its Labor opposition, as well as the entire Australian press, expended considerable resources ousting the Alkatiri administration in 2006. Its protracted “regime change” campaign was driven by concern that the Fretilin government was too oriented towards rival powers and was unwilling to accede to all of Australia’s demands for possession of swathes of the Timor Sea’s oil and gas reserves. Gusmao’s recent moves—both in the lead up to the events of February 11 and since—were no doubt known, if not directly instigated, by Canberra.
None of these issues has been canvassed in the Australian press. Not a single outlet has even reported Alkatiri’s statements in Tempo. To the extent that any political assessment has been attempted of the events surrounding the shootings outside Ramos-Horta’s residence, Reinado’s potential motivations are simply put down to insanity, thereby excusing the logical implausibility of the official version. The media’s performance is consistent with its role in 1999 and 2006, when it functioned as the primary promoter of the Howard government’s military operations, under the banner of “humanitarian intervention” and “democracy”.
World Socialist Web Site
By Patrick O’Connor
1 March 2008
East Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao has seized upon the crisis sparked by the February 11 wounding of President Jose Ramos-Horta and killing of former major Alfredo Reinado to enforce a number of repressive measures aimed at consolidating his unstable government. A spokesperson for Gusmao’s government announced on Monday that the “state of siege”—which involves a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew and a ban on demonstrations and unauthorised meetings—has been extended to March 23. More than 200 people have already been arrested, mostly for violating the curfew, although opposition parliamentarians and journalists have also been targeted.
The Gusmao government’s rush to utilise authoritarian forms of rule raises yet again the many outstanding questions concerning the events surrounding Reinado’s killing. According to the official version promoted by the government and the Australian and international press, the rebel soldier was shot dead after he and his men attempted to either kill or kidnap both President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao as part of a failed coup attempt. This account represents the least likely explanation for what took place on February 11.
While details remain murky, what is known points to the possibility that Reinado was set up for assassination. The rebel soldier had earlier threatened to publicly release details of Gusmao’s alleged role in directly instigating a mutiny of soldiers (the “petitioners”) in 2006. The mutiny sparked a political crisis that culminated in the intervention of hundreds of Australian troops and the ousting of the former Fretilin government. Reinado’s allegation was issued via a DVD that was widely circulated in January throughout East Timor.
The old adage, cui bono (to whose benefit?), remains a standard rule in criminal investigations. In light of what has transpired over the past fortnight, the undisputed primary beneficiaries of Reinado’s death have been the Australian-led foreign military forces stationed in East Timor and Gusmao himself.
The prime minister’s adoption of dictatorial-style powers has been met with sharp criticism within the country’s parliament. A number of Fretilin parliamentarians opposed the extension of the “state of siege” on the grounds that the constitutional requirement for a “serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional order” no longer existed. During the debate, opposition even emerged from within Gusmao’s CNRT party. “I and my friends are really disappointed with the implementation of the ‘State of Emergency,’” CNRT parliamentarian Cecilio Caminha declared. “In the ‘State of Emergency’ there are no rules that permit the security apparatus to attack civilian houses at night, and to forbid people from holding meetings and demonstrations.”
Fretilin has accused Gusmao of using the crisis to undermine its position. On February 19, the party’s parliamentarian and media spokesman Jose Teixeira was detained in Dili after six car loads of armed Timorese police allegedly took him from his home. Teixeira later claimed that police had no arrest warrant and acted without the knowledge of the senior police investigating officer. He was released the next day after Mari Alkatiri, Fretilin’s general secretary and former Timorese prime minister, lodged a complaint. “This is political persecution—Teixeira is an effective media spokesman and someone in authority wants to shut him up,” he declared. “It is a disgraceful attempt to politicise the police force and use the investigation into the shooting of the president for party-political gain.”
Both Timorese police and Australian soldiers have also targeted journalists.
On February 23, the East Timor Post’s senior layout editor, Agustinho Ta Pasea, was arrested while en route to the Dili printing presses with a computer file of the newspaper’s weekend edition. Post editor Mouzinho De Araujo told the Australian that Ta Pasea was stopped at 2 a.m., beaten by military police and then taken to a police station where he was assaulted again. De Araujo said his staff member was held for 11 hours on the grounds that he had violated the curfew, before being released with cuts and bruises on his face. “Maybe, it is because our newspaper has been tough on [the] authorities,” the editor said. Ta Pasea’s detention delayed the publication of that day’s Post edition. The Secretariat of State Security later issued a formal apology for the police officers’ use of what it described as “unjustified force”.
The incident came a few days after Time reporter Rory Callinan and photographer John Wilson were detained by Australian troops for three hours at gunpoint outside of Dili as they were attempting to reach the village of Dare. The Australian-dominated International Stabilisation Force (ISF) was conducting an operation in the area, supposedly in pursuit of Reinado’s followers allegedly involved in Ramos-Horta’s shooting. Journalists were refused entry through an ISF roadblock and were told they were barred from the “media free area”. Callinan and Wilson then walked for an hour through a jungle trail to try to access Dare by foot.
Callinan later told the Australian that when they neared the village: “Two Australians jumped out of the bushes wearing ‘camo’ paint, pointing their guns, ordering us to get down. We were told to hand over our mobile phones, all our camera equipment and passports and told to sit without talking. The guy said: ‘We’re detaining you for your own safety and I can’t tell you more.’ I said, ‘So we can’t move?’ He said, ‘I’m telling you, I am detaining you. I can physically detain you if I want, but I choose not to at this point.’ We were wondering why they were letting dozens of East Timorese wander about with no apparent concern for their safety.”
The two men were held in the jungle for three hours, until sundown, when they were told they would be allowed into Dare. After they later walked back to Dili they were held again for breaching curfew. “They confiscated our gear again,” Callinan said. “We said, ‘But you’ve already detained us for three hours, which is why we are in breach of the curfew....’ The East Timorese with us were saying this was the sort of thing that happened under Indonesian times.”
The incident underscores the neo-colonial character of the Australian occupation of “independent” East Timor. Utilising the political crisis for its own ends, the Rudd Labor government has bolstered the size of the intervention force and declared that Australian forces will remain “for as long as they are required.” As with the previous deployments in 1999 and 2006, the latest operation is above all driven by Canberra’s determination to maintain its domination over the strategically significant and oil-rich territory, and to shut out rival powers such as China and Portugal. Rudd and Gusmao appear to have reached a mutually beneficial arrangement in which the Timorese leader gives the Australian military a free hand, in return for the Australian government’s continued political backing. Rudd and his ministers have maintained a strict silence in relation to the Gusmao government’s recent authoritarian measures.
The ISF’s actions in Dare also raise the question as to what Australian troops were doing, that they did not want the media to monitor. The status of the Australian military’s supposed pursuit of Reinado’s wanted men remains unclear. More than 1,100 Australian troops, including at least 80 elite SAS personnel, are now on the ground in East Timor or stationed on naval warships offshore. Gusmao has reportedly authorised these forces to use lethal force. Yet despite the Australian military’s vast array of surveillance technology and extensive knowledge of Reinado’s group, amassed over the last two years, the occupying troops have apparently been unable to track down any of the alleged would-be assassins of Ramos-Horta.
Was Gusmao’s government facing dissolution?
Events since February 11 make clear just how convenient Reinado’s death was for both Gusmao and Canberra.
The former major’s accusation that the prime minister had deliberately instigated the petitioner’s protests in 2006 was seriously undermining Gusmao’s already unstable three-party coalition government. Just as Reinado’s accusations were circulating throughout East Timor, the government passed its first budget, slashing food rations for the 100,000 internally displaced refugees and cutting pensions. At the same time, the government boasted that it was lowering corporate and investment taxes to among the lowest levels in the world.
These measures, which will further increase social inequality in the deeply impoverished country, drew widespread opposition from ordinary Timorese and inflamed tensions and infighting within the government. Rumours spread in Dili that Fernando “La Sama” de Araujo, leader of the Democratic Party and now acting president, would withdraw from the coalition.
Gusmao meanwhile was refusing to deny Reinado’s allegations and threatened to arrest those journalists pursuing the story. Alkatiri demanded that Gusmao resign and that fresh elections be called.
There is evidence indicating that President Ramos-Horta was preparing to publicly endorse such demands. According to the Timor News Line web site, which translates Timorese media reports into English, on February 11 (the same day Reinado was killed) the Diario Nacional reported that: “Fretilin Secretary General, Mari Alkatiri, said President Jose Ramos Horta and the UN Secretary General have agreed with Fretilin’s proposal of holding another election in the country”.
The latest issue of the Indonesian Tempo magazine features an interview with Alkatiri in which the former prime minister claims there was a connection between the events of February 11 and a meeting allegedly convened by President Ramos-Horta a week earlier.
“There was a meeting of politicians at Horta’s residence a week before the shootings,” Alkatiri said. “Attending the meeting were members of the Timorese Reconstruction National Party (CNRT) led by Xanana Gusmao, the Social Democrat Party, the Timor Social Democrat Party Association (ASDT) and the Fretilin Party ... President Horta welcomed the proposal of the Fretilin Party to the UN Secretary-General. Essentially it united all parties under the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) with the Fretilin, and forming an inclusive government, a national unity government. Fretilin itself refused to join in the national unity government like this one. The initiative was taken to resolve the problem of Alfredo Reinado, deserters led by Salsinha Gastao and also the refugees.”
Asked if any of Timor’s “party elites” were involved in Reinado’s killing, Alkatiri refused to directly answer or mention Gusmao by name, but said, “I will just say that the person behind Horta’s shooting perhaps disagreed with the President’s initiative to form a new government and hold another election.”
If Alkatiri’s account is true, it places in fresh perspective the secret deal struck between Ramos-Horta and Reinado just four weeks before the rebel soldier was killed. On January 13, the two men brokered a deal whereby Reinado would first submit to house arrest and then soon after be amnestied by Ramos-Horta. Could it be that the president, formerly a close ally of Gusmao, regarded the break-down in relations between Reinado and the prime minister as an intolerable threat to the agreement he had just brokered, which required the formation of a new coalition administration between Fretilin, the ASDT, and elements of the CNRT?
If so, the official version of Reinado’s killing becomes even more implausible. The former major would have been attempting to assassinate or kidnap Ramos-Horta, who had not only guaranteed his freedom, but was also preparing to lend his weight to the ousting of Gusmao, whom Reinado was accusing of being a criminal and a traitor. On the other hand, if the scenario suggested by Alkatiri’s statements is true, Gusmao would have had an even more powerful motive to eliminate Reinado, and trigger a political crisis through which he could extend his authority.
The possibility of such a conspiracy raises immediate questions regarding the Australian government’s role. There is little possibility that Australian authorities—which include highly placed government and military advisors as well as an extensive network of intelligence agents and informants—would have been ignorant of the various political ructions in Dili. The prospect of a return to a Fretilin-led government would have sounded alarm bells. The former Howard government, with the unstinting support of its Labor opposition, as well as the entire Australian press, expended considerable resources ousting the Alkatiri administration in 2006. Its protracted “regime change” campaign was driven by concern that the Fretilin government was too oriented towards rival powers and was unwilling to accede to all of Australia’s demands for possession of swathes of the Timor Sea’s oil and gas reserves. Gusmao’s recent moves—both in the lead up to the events of February 11 and since—were no doubt known, if not directly instigated, by Canberra.
None of these issues has been canvassed in the Australian press. Not a single outlet has even reported Alkatiri’s statements in Tempo. To the extent that any political assessment has been attempted of the events surrounding the shootings outside Ramos-Horta’s residence, Reinado’s potential motivations are simply put down to insanity, thereby excusing the logical implausibility of the official version. The media’s performance is consistent with its role in 1999 and 2006, when it functioned as the primary promoter of the Howard government’s military operations, under the banner of “humanitarian intervention” and “democracy”.
World Socialist Web Site
O XANANA QUANDO FUGIU DO SUPOSTO ATAQUE, CAGOU-SE TODO E ACREDITO QUE DEIXOU TODO ESTE ESTRUME NOS PES DO MARACUJA, E ASSIM MARACUJA MORTOU!
TIMOR: UM ESTADO FALHADO?
por Abílio Araújo*
Tenho ouvido e lido bastante sobre o nosso País, Timor Leste.
Assisti, em Díli, através da TVTL – Televisão de Timor Leste às primeiras declarações do Primeiro Ministro Xanana Gusmão sobre os acontecimentos daquela manhã de 11 de Fevreiro. Sou pouco propenso a ir na onda das férteis imaginações que alimentam e dão curso aos rumores e boatos quanto ao envolvimento directo de terceiros nos acontecimentos de grande gravidade que, gracas a Deus, não tiveram um desfecho trágico para as vidas dos nossos dirigentes de Estado, o PR Ramos Horta e o PM Xanana Gusmão, dos seus elementos da seguranca e familiares. Particularmente grave é também a tentativa de se lançar a suspeição sobre o proprio PM Xanana Gusmão que, segundo certos analistas, teria engendrado aqueles atentados. Assim, as declarações de Salsinha ao jornal português Expresso, de 23 de Fevereiro, acabam por deitar por terra aquela suspeição alimentada por quem muito leu George Simenon, Agatha Christie e outros. Aguardemos serenamente, sim, pelo resultado das investigações em curso que esperamos sejam conduzidas por entidades credíveis e independentes e nos possam trazer factos novos do porquê de tais tresloucados actos.
Por isso, quero ressaltar das declarações do Primeiro-ministro Xanana Gusmão logo durante a sua Comunicação ao País nos ecrãs da TVTL a alusão feita aos que querem fazer de Timor “ um Estado Falhado”.
Creio que esta é a questão da ordem do dia colocada aos Timorenses e seus verdadeiros aliados e amigos.
Recuso embarcar na teoria dos que insatisfeitos para com Xanana propagandeiam aos quatro ventos que este líder ter-se-á já esquecido ou deitado por terra todos os sonhos por cuja concretização tanto tem lutado como o de ver um Timor Leste a singrar nos caminhos da verdadeira Independência com Paz, Democracia, Concórdia e Desenvolvimento. Disse-o no almoço a sós com o PR Ramos Horta - a quem desejo melhoras muito rápidas -, em 5 de Fevereiro passado, num restaurante de Díli quando abordámos a situação presente e os caminhos a percorrer. Sou de opinião de que o Governo de Xanana Gusmão é um Governo legítimo e com base parlamentar comprovada como se viu aquando da aprovação do Plano e Orçamento para o corrente ano fiscal. Enquanto se mantiver esta base parlamentar não haveria razões para eleições antecipadas. Além disso, a cura de oposição a que a FRETILIN está sujeita neste momento pode ser salutar para ela própria, para a Democracia e para o País.
Não há dúvida que o País continua a ver por resolver dois dos três problemas mais prementes, o dos deslocados internos e o dos peticionários, já que aparentemente o problema do malogrado irmão Alfredo Reinado que teve um desfecho triste – a morte de alguém é sempre muito triste e lamentável – merece outra abordagem. No entanto, há esforços sérios para a resolução desses problemas cuja responsabilidade não deve ser unicamente atribuída a este Governo mas tambem à Oposição, que foi responsável pelo I Governo Constitucional e que por incompetência e adiamento do tratamento dos problemas nas áreas de Defesa e Seguranca comprovadamente manifesta no mau desempenho dos seus dois Ministros (posterior e tardiamente demitidos Dr Roque Rodrigues e Rogerio Lobato) permitiu a eclosão e alastramento dos problemas que vieram a desembocar na crise de 2006.
O cenário de eleições antecipadas não viria alterar profundamente o quadro parlamentar existente em relação aos que querem ascender ao Poder novamente. Só a ambição do poder escudada em tergiversações de ordem político-partidária para consumo imediato de quem não soube aceitar a derrota eleitoral, pode permitir posturas de avestruz. Senão vejamos. A FRETILIN de Luolu e Alkatiri perdeu a maioria confortável que possuía e hoje está reduzida a cerca de um terço de deputados. A AMP, no caso de vir a concorrer em coligação, ultrapassará a FRETILIN, evidentemente. A dúvida que poderá’ eventualmente surgir é se aquela ultrapassará os 50% dos lugares num próximo Parlamento. A grande novidade poderá porventura provir da previsível Convergência dos sete Partidos sem assento parlamentar tendo à frente o PNT- Partido Nacionalista Timorense, Partidos que obtiveram nas ultimas eleições o total de 45.000 votos. Esta outra força poderá vir a ter peso e expressão para clarificar a geometria da configuração parlamentar. No entanto, como é sabido, estes sete Partidos, no actual cenário político, já exprimiram o seu reconhecimento do actual Governo da AMP e querem contribuir para a estabilidade governativa que é a condição básica para que o País possa, em segurança, concórdia e democracia, erradicar gradualmente a pobreza, lançar as bases para o Desenvolvimento de Timor e extirpar definitivamente os sonhos e planos dos que querem fazer de Timor um “Estado Falhado”.
Há enormes desafios e responsabilidades colocadas aos Timorenses e à Comunidade Internacional. No que toca aos Timorenses, é hora de tocar a rebate para congregar todos os filhos de Timor nos grandes objectivos da Segurança e Desenvolvimento que são, em primeiro lugar, tarefas do Estado. A problemática da Segurança está intimamente ligada à do Desenvolvimento, eterna interrogação do ovo e da galinha... Os programas sociais do actual Governo como o do apoio justo e inadiável aos Combatentes da Libertação, às viúvas e órfãos constituem “per se” um meio de conter focos de revolta e eclosão social já vividos no passado. Outrossim, contribuem para aumentar o rendimento disponível das famílias, o consumo e a poupanca.
Não obstante os objectivos plausíveis desses programas e a justiça social que prosseguem, o arranque “take off” da Economia de Desenvolvimento Timorense far-se-á verdadeiramente quando o Estado em cooperação com o sector empresarial privado nacional e o Investimento Externo se lançar decisivamente na construção de grandes obras de Infra-estruturas do País, dando prioridade ao sector energético, e de comunicações, vias e rodovias, novos polos de desenvolvimento geradores de mobilidade interna de mão-de-obra e respectivas familias. O sector empresarial privado deve ser encorajado pelo Estado a desempenhar o seu papel e não ser minimizado a favor dos grandes grupos estrangeiros. O sector privado, sendo tão incipiente e frágil, como os demais sectores da vida nacional incluindo o próprio Estado, tem funções insubstituíveis na dinamização da vida económica nacional, nos sectores primário, secundário e terciário.
Timor vive o paradoxo de não dever um único cêntimo ao estrangeiro, ter os seus cofres cheios de dinheiro depositado em New York, mas o seu bem mais precioso - o seu povo - está depauperado, as empresas e famílias endividadas aos bancos locais, as estradas em mau estado que as chuvas se encarregam de inutilizar definitivamente com a destruição de várias pontes pelo país fora, os preços dos produtos disparam em flecha, a agricultura em estagnação, etc..
É claro que nada se faz da noite para o dia, todos o sabemos. Há demasiados problemas que urge seleccionar e escalonar por ordem de prioridades, sem esquecer a necessidade de inventariar os recursos financeiros passíveis de serem mobilizados, incluindo o recurso a empréstimos do Exterior. A inventariação desses recursos inclui tambem os provemiemtes das ajudas internacionais sejam de Governos sejam de ONGs ou organismos transnacionais para cuja aplicação se deve obedecer a um Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento a fim de evitar a saturação de programas num determinado sector ou, pior ainda, a criação de dinâmicas centrífugas em relação a um modelo de desenvolvimento equilibrado e sustentado.
Impõe-se uma boa gestão e aplicação financeiras adequadas do Fundo Petrolífero que não a actual gestão defensiva em resultado de uma concepção corporizada em legislação pouco adaptada à realidade de Timor. Uma nova politica de Desenvolvimento económico permitirá, sem reservas de qualquer espécie, relançar Timor Leste na senda do Progresso irreversível e no acenar de um adeus definitivo aos sonhadores do Estado Falhado.
No que toca ao sector da Defesa e Segurança, impõe-se avançar com as reformas que constituem o objectivo deste Governo para este ano. Dignificar o papel das Forças Armadas e seus membros, bastião da luta pela Independência e Soberania e responsabilizá-las como Força Histórica indesmentível da Unidade do Povo desde a Fronteira até Tutuala e Jaco passando por Atauro e Oecusse. Equipá-las e modernizá-las nas suas componentes terrestre, marítima e aérea com vista a defesa da Soberania e Integridade Territorial e recusando inequivocamente os “conselhos” dos que pretendem extingui-las. Aprofundar a formação da Polícia Nacional nas diferentes áreas de actuação e conferir aos seus membros os meios operacionais necessários.
As Forças Internacionais são bem-vindas mas não para ficarem de vez. A nossa memória colectiva ainda não esqueceu os homens de batina branca que nos primórdios do século XVI aportaram nas nossas praias e que a pretexto da evangelização abriram as portas dos nossos Reinos Antigos para o saque do nosso “sândalo salutífero e cheiroso” e posterior radicação do sistema colonial. Encerrados os dois Ciclos do Sândalo e do Café, Timor inaugura o seu terceiro Ciclo do Petróleo. Tudo deve ser feito para que este Ciclo inaugure a Independência Nacional tão almejada pelos nossos maiores.
Em suma, nao se pode negar a este Governo da AMP a oportunidade de realizar o seu trabalho. O seu mérito ou demérito dependerá da sua capacidade de acolher ou não todas as contribuicoes que lhe forem presentes para bem de Timor, incluindo alguma retórica inflamada desde que imbuída do sentido de construção e não de destruição ou revanchismo. Haja discernimento e patriotismo para corresponder ao apelo de Taur Matan Ruak no sentido de submeter os interesses partidários aos do Povo e País. Todos são necessários e cada um deverá desempenhar cabalmente as suas funções e, em tempo próprio, o Povo julgará novamente nas urnas o desempenho de cada um e de todos. ASSIM, Timor ir-se-á construindo, melhorando as condições de vida do seu Povo e afastando definitivamente o fantasma do Estado Falhado!
* Autor foi fundador da Fretilin, autoria da canção Foho Ramelau, Hino Nacional entre outros. Durante o piriode da resistência contra ocupação, publicou vários obras de natureza cultural, antropologica Timorense. O artigo foi publicado pelo Diario Nacional de 29 de Fevereiro e Semanario de 1 de Marco do corrente!
DEMOCRACIA A PROVA DE BALA
NUMA BELA MANHA DE SEGUNDA FEIRA
QUIZERAM A DEMOCRACIA MATAR
MAS NEM BALAS NEM FEITICEIRA
JAMAIS SERA CAPAZ DE NOS CALAR
AS VOZES DE BURRO ECOAM
OS "EXPERTS", BOTAM FALADURA
E NO MEIO DE TUDO ISTO
O HORTA VAI PASSANDO "VIDA DURA"
O SALSINHA ENTREGA NAO ENTREGA
O FUTEBOL TAMBEM TEM INTERVALO
ENQUANTO O DIABO O OLHO ESFREGA
ESTA NA HORA DA LUTA DO GALO
O PROCURADOR QUER SABER QUE DIA E
POIS ANDA MUITO CONFUSO
E MELHOR PERGUNTAR AO S. TOME
QUE VIVE EM DIFERENTE FUSO
TIMOR ONLINE ESTA A CAIR DE MADURO
CADA VEZ MAIS PARA UM LADO SO
ASSIM VAO SOANDO A ESTURRO
E VAI ACABAR O PAO DE LO
UM ABRACO
MAU DICK
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